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Switch from the old AES library functions (which use struct
crypto_aes_ctx) to the new ones (which use struct aes_enckey). This
eliminates the unnecessary computation and caching of the decryption
round keys. The new AES en/decryption functions are also much faster
and use AES instructions when supported by the CPU.
Note that in addition to the change in the key preparation function and
the key struct type itself, the change in the type of the key struct
results in aes_encrypt() (which is temporarily a type-generic macro)
calling the new encryption function rather than the old one.
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260112192035.10427-34-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
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Fix build warnings with W=1 that started appearing after
commit a934a57a42f6 ("scripts/misc-check: check missing #include
<linux/export.h> when W=1").
While at it, also sort the include lists alphabetically. (Keep
asm/irqflags.h last, as otherwise it doesn't build on alpha.)
This handles all of lib/crypto/, but not arch/*/lib/crypto/. The
exports in arch/*/lib/crypto/ will go away when the code is properly
integrated into lib/crypto/ as planned.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250613184814.50173-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
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Annotate various keys, ivs, and other byte arrays with __nonstring so
that static initializers will not complain about truncating the trailing
NUL byte under GCC 15 with -Wunterminated-string-initialization enabled.
Silences many warnings like:
../lib/crypto/aesgcm.c:642:27: warning: initializer-string for array of 'unsigned char' truncates NUL terminator but destination lacks 'nonstring' attribute (13 chars into 12 available) [-Wunterminated-string-initialization]
642 | .iv = "\xca\xfe\xba\xbe\xfa\xce\xdb\xad"
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Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250529173113.work.760-kees@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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The negative-sense of CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS is a longstanding
mistake that regularly causes confusion. Especially bad is that you can
have CRYPTO=n && CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS=n, which is ambiguous.
Replace CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS with CRYPTO_SELFTESTS which has the
expected behavior.
The tests continue to be disabled by default.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The stack frame in libaesgcm_init triggers a size warning on x86-64.
Reduce it by making buf static.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Add kernel documentation for the aesgcm_mac.
This function generates the authentication tag using the AES-GCM algorithm.
Signed-off-by: Sagar Vashnav <sagarvashnav72427@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Implement a minimal library version of AES-GCM based on the existing
library implementations of AES and multiplication in GF(2^128). Using
these primitives, GCM can be implemented in a straight-forward manner.
GCM has a couple of sharp edges, i.e., the amount of input data
processed with the same initialization vector (IV) should be capped to
protect the counter from 32-bit rollover (or carry), and the size of the
authentication tag should be fixed for a given key. [0]
The former concern is addressed trivially, given that the function call
API uses 32-bit signed types for the input lengths. It is still up to
the caller to avoid IV reuse in general, but this is not something we
can police at the implementation level.
As for the latter concern, let's make the authentication tag size part
of the key schedule, and only permit it to be configured as part of the
key expansion routine.
Note that table based AES implementations are susceptible to known
plaintext timing attacks on the encryption key. The AES library already
attempts to mitigate this to some extent, but given that the counter
mode encryption used by GCM operates exclusively on known plaintext by
construction (the IV and therefore the initial counter value are known
to an attacker), let's take some extra care to mitigate this, by calling
the AES library with interrupts disabled.
[0] https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/legacy/sp/nistspecialpublication800-38d.pdf
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/c6fb9b25-a4b6-2e4a-2dd1-63adda055a49@amd.com/
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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