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The add_fd_from_fd_array() function takes a file descriptor as a
parameter and tries to add either map or btf to the corresponding
list of used objects. As was reported by Dan Carpenter, since the
commit c81e4322acf0 ("bpf: Fix a potential use-after-free of BTF
object"), the fdget() is called twice on the file descriptor, and
thus userspace, potentially, can replace the file pointed to by the
file descriptor in between the two calls. On practice, this shouldn't
break anything on the kernel side, but for consistency fix the code
such that only one fdget() is executed.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/aY689z7gHNv8rgVO@stanley.mountain/
Fixes: ccd2d799ed44 ("bpf: Fix a potential use-after-free of BTF object")
Signed-off-by: Anton Protopopov <a.s.protopopov@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260213212949.759321-1-a.s.protopopov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Refcounting in the check_pseudo_btf_id() function is incorrect:
the __check_pseudo_btf_id() function might get called with a zero
refcounted btf. Fix this, and patch related code accordingly.
v3: rephrase a comment (AI)
v2: fix a refcount leak introduced in v1 (AI)
Reported-by: syzbot+5a0f1995634f7c1dadbf@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=5a0f1995634f7c1dadbf
Fixes: 76145f725532 ("bpf: Refactor check_pseudo_btf_id")
Signed-off-by: Anton Protopopov <a.s.protopopov@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260209132904.63908-1-a.s.protopopov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Previously, the verifier only tracked positive constant deltas between
linked registers using BPF_ADD. This limitation meant patterns like:
r1 = r0;
r1 += -4;
if r1 s>= 0 goto l0_%=; // r1 >= 0 implies r0 >= 4
// verifier couldn't propagate bounds back to r0
if r0 != 0 goto l0_%=;
r0 /= 0; // Verifier thinks this is reachable
l0_%=:
Similar limitation exists for 32-bit registers.
With this change, the verifier can now track negative deltas in reg->off
enabling bound propagation for the above pattern.
For alu32, we make sure the destination register has the upper 32 bits
as 0s before creating the link. BPF_ADD_CONST is split into
BPF_ADD_CONST64 and BPF_ADD_CONST32, the latter is used in case of alu32
and sync_linked_regs uses this to zext the result if known_reg has this
flag.
Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260204151741.2678118-2-puranjay@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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This patch implements bitwise tracking (tnum analysis) for BPF_END
(byte swap) operation.
Currently, the BPF verifier does not track value for BPF_END operation,
treating the result as completely unknown. This limits the verifier's
ability to prove safety of programs that perform endianness conversions,
which are common in networking code.
For example, the following code pattern for port number validation:
int test(struct pt_regs *ctx) {
__u64 x = bpf_get_prandom_u32();
x &= 0x3f00; // Range: [0, 0x3f00], var_off: (0x0; 0x3f00)
x = bswap16(x); // Should swap to range [0, 0x3f], var_off: (0x0; 0x3f)
if (x > 0x3f) goto trap;
return 0;
trap:
return *(u64 *)NULL; // Should be unreachable
}
Currently generates verifier output:
1: (54) w0 &= 16128 ; R0=scalar(smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=16128,var_off=(0x0; 0x3f00))
2: (d7) r0 = bswap16 r0 ; R0=scalar()
3: (25) if r0 > 0x3f goto pc+2 ; R0=scalar(smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=63,var_off=(0x0; 0x3f))
Without this patch, even though the verifier knows `x` has certain bits
set, after bswap16, it loses all tracking information and treats port
as having a completely unknown value [0, 65535].
According to the BPF instruction set[1], there are 3 kinds of BPF_END:
1. `bswap(16|32|64)`: opcode=0xd7 (BPF_END | BPF_ALU64 | BPF_TO_LE)
- do unconditional swap
2. `le(16|32|64)`: opcode=0xd4 (BPF_END | BPF_ALU | BPF_TO_LE)
- on big-endian: do swap
- on little-endian: truncation (16/32-bit) or no-op (64-bit)
3. `be(16|32|64)`: opcode=0xdc (BPF_END | BPF_ALU | BPF_TO_BE)
- on little-endian: do swap
- on big-endian: truncation (16/32-bit) or no-op (64-bit)
Since BPF_END operations are inherently bit-wise permutations, tnum
(bitwise tracking) offers the most efficient and precise mechanism
for value analysis. By implementing `tnum_bswap16`, `tnum_bswap32`,
and `tnum_bswap64`, we can derive exact `var_off` values concisely,
directly reflecting the bit-level changes.
Here is the overview of changes:
1. In `tnum_bswap(16|32|64)` (kernel/bpf/tnum.c):
Call `swab(16|32|64)` function on the value and mask of `var_off`, and
do truncation for 16/32-bit cases.
2. In `adjust_scalar_min_max_vals` (kernel/bpf/verifier.c):
Call helper function `scalar_byte_swap`.
- Only do byte swap when
* alu64 (unconditional swap) OR
* switching between big-endian and little-endian machines.
- If need do byte swap:
* Firstly call `tnum_bswap(16|32|64)` to update `var_off`.
* Then reset the bound since byte swap scrambles the range.
- For 16/32-bit cases, truncate dst register to match the swapped size.
This enables better verification of networking code that frequently uses
byte swaps for protocol processing, reducing false positive rejections.
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/bpf/standardization/instruction-set.rst
Co-developed-by: Shenghao Yuan <shenghaoyuan0928@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Shenghao Yuan <shenghaoyuan0928@163.com>
Co-developed-by: Yazhou Tang <tangyazhou518@outlook.com>
Signed-off-by: Yazhou Tang <tangyazhou518@outlook.com>
Signed-off-by: Tianci Cao <ziye@zju.edu.cn>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260204111503.77871-2-ziye@zju.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Extend the verifier to recognize struct bpf_timer as a valid kfunc
argument type. Previously, bpf_timer was only supported in BPF helpers.
This prepares for adding timer-related kfuncs in subsequent patches.
Signed-off-by: Mykyta Yatsenko <yatsenko@meta.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260201025403.66625-3-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
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The BPF stream kfuncs bpf_stream_vprintk and bpf_stream_print_stack
do not sleep and so are safe to call while holding a lock. Amend
the verifier to allow that.
Signed-off-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>
Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260203180424.14057-4-emil@etsalapatis.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Scalar register IDs are used by the verifier to track relationships
between registers and enable bounds propagation across those
relationships. Once an ID becomes singular (i.e. only a single
register/stack slot carries it), it can no longer contribute to bounds
propagation and effectively becomes stale. The previous commit makes the
verifier clear such ids before caching the state.
When comparing the current and cached states for pruning, these stale
IDs can cause technically equivalent states to be considered different
and thus prevent pruning.
For example, in the selftest added in the next commit, two registers -
r6 and r7 are not linked to any other registers and get cached with
id=0, in the current state, they are both linked to each other with
id=A. Before this commit, check_scalar_ids would give temporary ids to
r6 and r7 (say tid1 and tid2) and then check_ids() would map tid1->A,
and when it would see tid2->A, it would not consider these state
equivalent.
Relax scalar ID equivalence by treating rold->id == 0 as "independent":
if the old state did not rely on any ID relationships for a register,
then any ID/linking present in the current state only adds constraints
and is always safe to accept for pruning. Implement this by returning
true immediately in check_scalar_ids() when old_id == 0.
Maintain correctness for the opposite direction (old_id != 0 && cur_id
== 0) by still allocating a temporary ID for cur_id == 0. This avoids
incorrectly allowing multiple independent current registers (id==0) to
satisfy a single linked old ID during mapping.
Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260203165102.2302462-5-puranjay@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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The maybe_widen_reg() function widens imprecise scalar registers to
unknown when their values differ between the cached and current states.
Previously, it used regs_exact() which also compared register IDs via
check_ids(), requiring registers to have matching IDs (or mapped IDs) to
be considered exact.
For scalar widening purposes, what matters is whether the value tracking
(bounds, tnum, var_off) is the same, not whether the IDs match. Two
scalars with identical value constraints but different IDs represent the
same abstract value and don't need to be widened.
Introduce scalars_exact_for_widen() that only compares the
value-tracking portion of bpf_reg_state (fields before 'id'). This
allows the verifier to preserve more scalar value information during
state merging when IDs differ but actual tracked values are identical,
reducing unnecessary widening and potentially improving verification
precision.
Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260203165102.2302462-4-puranjay@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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The verifier assigns ids to scalar registers/stack slots when they are
linked through a mov or stack spill/fill instruction. These ids are
later used to propagate newly found bounds from one register to all
registers that share the same id. The verifier also compares the ids of
these registers in current state and cached state when making pruning
decisions.
When an ID becomes singular (i.e., only a single register or stack slot
has that ID), it can no longer participate in bounds propagation. During
comparisons between current and cached states for pruning decisions,
however, such stale IDs can prevent pruning of otherwise equivalent
states.
Find and clear all singular ids before caching a state in
is_state_visited(). struct bpf_idset which is currently unused has been
repurposed for this use case.
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260203165102.2302462-3-puranjay@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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The next commit will allow clearing of scalar ids if no other
register/stack slot has that id. This is because if only one register
has a unique id, it can't participate in bounds propagation and is
equivalent to having no id.
But if the id of a stack slot is cleared by clear_singular_ids() in the
next commit, reading that stack slot into a register will not establish
a link because the stack slot's id is cleared.
This can happen in a situation where a register is spilled and later
loses its id due to a multiply operation (for example) and then the
stack slot's id becomes singular and can be cleared.
Make sure that scalar stack slots have an id before we read them into a
register.
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260203165102.2302462-2-puranjay@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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The added fsession does not prevent running on those architectures, that
haven't added fsession support.
For example, try to run fsession tests on arm64:
test_fsession_basic:PASS:fsession_test__open_and_load 0 nsec
test_fsession_basic:PASS:fsession_attach 0 nsec
check_result:FAIL:test_run_opts err unexpected error: -14 (errno 14)
In order to prevent such errors, add bpf_jit_supports_fsession() to guard
those architectures.
Fixes: 2d419c44658f ("bpf: add fsession support")
Acked-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Leon Hwang <leon.hwang@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260131144950.16294-2-leon.hwang@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Consolidate all logic for verifying special map fields in the single
function check_map_field_pointer().
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mykyta Yatsenko <yatsenko@meta.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260130-verif_special_fields-v2-2-2c59e637da7d@meta.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Introduce struct bpf_map_desc to hold bpf_map pointer and map uid. Use
this struct in both bpf_call_arg_meta and bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta
instead of having different representations:
- bpf_call_arg_meta had separate map_ptr and map_uid fields
- bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta had an anonymous inline struct
This unifies the map fields layout across both metadata structures,
making the code more consistent and preparing for further refactoring of
map field pointer validation.
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mykyta Yatsenko <yatsenko@meta.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260130-verif_special_fields-v2-1-2c59e637da7d@meta.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Allowing sleepable programs to use tail calls.
Making sure we can't mix sleepable and non-sleepable bpf programs
in tail call map (BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY) and allowing it to be
used in sleepable programs.
Sleepable programs can be preempted and sleep which might bring
new source of race conditions, but both direct and indirect tail
calls should not be affected.
Direct tail calls work by patching direct jump to callee into bpf
caller program, so no problem there. We atomically switch from nop
to jump instruction.
Indirect tail call reads the callee from the map and then jumps to
it. The callee bpf program can't disappear (be released) from the
caller, because it is executed under rcu lock (rcu_read_lock_trace).
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Leon Hwang <leon.hwang@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260130081208.1130204-2-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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The BPF verifier assumes `insn_aux->nospec_result` is only set for
direct memory writes (e.g., `*(u32*)(r1+off) = r2`). However, the
assertion fails to account for helper calls (e.g.,
`bpf_skb_load_bytes_relative`) that perform writes to stack memory. Make
the check more precise to resolve this.
The problem is that `BPF_CALL` instructions have `BPF_CLASS(insn->code)
== BPF_JMP`, which triggers the warning check:
- Helpers like `bpf_skb_load_bytes_relative` write to stack memory
- `check_helper_call()` loops through `meta.access_size`, calling
`check_mem_access(..., BPF_WRITE)`
- `check_stack_write()` sets `insn_aux->nospec_result = 1`
- Since `BPF_CALL` is encoded as `BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL`, the warning fires
Execution flow:
```
1. Drop capabilities → Enable Spectre mitigation
2. Load BPF program
└─> do_check()
├─> check_cond_jmp_op() → Marks dead branch as speculative
│ └─> push_stack(..., speculative=true)
├─> pop_stack() → state->speculative = 1
├─> check_helper_call() → Processes helper in dead branch
│ └─> check_mem_access(..., BPF_WRITE)
│ └─> insn_aux->nospec_result = 1
└─> Checks: state->speculative && insn_aux->nospec_result
└─> BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP → WARNING
```
To fix the assert, it would be nice to be able to reuse
bpf_insn_successors() here, but bpf_insn_successors()->cnt is not
exactly what we want as it may also be 1 for BPF_JA. Instead, we could
check opcode_info.can_jump, but then we would have to share the table
between the functions. This would mean moving the table out of the
function and adding bpf_opcode_info(). As the verifier_bug_if() only
runs for insns with nospec_result set, the impact on verification time
would likely still be negligible. However, I assume sharing
bpf_opcode_info() between liveness.c and verifier.c will not be worth
it. It seems as only adjust_jmp_off() could also be simplified using it,
and there imm/off is touched. Thus it is maybe better to rely on exact
opcode/class matching there.
Therefore, to avoid this sharing only for a verifier_bug_if(), just
check the opcode. This should now cover all opcodes for which can_jump
in bpf_insn_successors() is true.
Parts of the description and example are taken from the bug report.
Fixes: dadb59104c64 ("bpf: Fix aux usage after do_check_insn()")
Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>
Reported-by: Yinhao Hu <dddddd@hust.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Kaiyan Mei <M202472210@hust.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Dongliang Mu <dzm91@hust.edu.cn>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/7678017d-b760-4053-a2d8-a6879b0dbeeb@hust.edu.cn/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260127115912.3026761-2-luis.gerhorst@fau.de
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Implement session cookie for fsession. The session cookies will be stored
in the stack, and the layout of the stack will look like this:
return value -> 8 bytes
argN -> 8 bytes
...
arg1 -> 8 bytes
nr_args -> 8 bytes
ip (optional) -> 8 bytes
cookie2 -> 8 bytes
cookie1 -> 8 bytes
The offset of the cookie for the current bpf program, which is in 8-byte
units, is stored in the
"(((u64 *)ctx)[-1] >> BPF_TRAMP_COOKIE_INDEX_SHIFT) & 0xFF". Therefore, we
can get the session cookie with ((u64 *)ctx)[-offset].
Implement and inline the bpf_session_cookie() for the fsession in the
verifier.
Signed-off-by: Menglong Dong <dongml2@chinatelecom.cn>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260124062008.8657-6-dongml2@chinatelecom.cn
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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If fsession exists, we will use the bit (1 << BPF_TRAMP_IS_RETURN_SHIFT)
in ((u64 *)ctx)[-1] to store the "is_return" flag.
The logic of bpf_session_is_return() for fsession is implemented in the
verifier by inline following code:
bool bpf_session_is_return(void *ctx)
{
return (((u64 *)ctx)[-1] >> BPF_TRAMP_IS_RETURN_SHIFT) & 1;
}
Signed-off-by: Menglong Dong <dongml2@chinatelecom.cn>
Co-developed-by: Leon Hwang <leon.hwang@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Leon Hwang <leon.hwang@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260124062008.8657-5-dongml2@chinatelecom.cn
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Add the function argument of "void *ctx" to bpf_session_cookie() and
bpf_session_is_return(), which is a preparation of the next patch.
The two kfunc is seldom used now, so it will not introduce much effect
to change their function prototype.
Signed-off-by: Menglong Dong <dongml2@chinatelecom.cn>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260124062008.8657-4-dongml2@chinatelecom.cn
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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For now, ((u64 *)ctx)[-1] is used to store the nr_args in the trampoline.
However, 1 byte is enough to store such information. Therefore, we use
only the least significant byte of ((u64 *)ctx)[-1] to store the nr_args,
and reserve the rest for other usages.
Signed-off-by: Menglong Dong <dongml2@chinatelecom.cn>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260124062008.8657-3-dongml2@chinatelecom.cn
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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The fsession is something that similar to kprobe session. It allow to
attach a single BPF program to both the entry and the exit of the target
functions.
Introduce the struct bpf_fsession_link, which allows to add the link to
both the fentry and fexit progs_hlist of the trampoline.
Signed-off-by: Menglong Dong <dongml2@chinatelecom.cn>
Co-developed-by: Leon Hwang <leon.hwang@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Leon Hwang <leon.hwang@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260124062008.8657-2-dongml2@chinatelecom.cn
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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For now, bpf_get_func_arg() and bpf_get_func_arg_cnt() is not supported by
the BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP, which is not convenient to get the argument of the
tracepoint, especially for the case that the position of the arguments in
a tracepoint can change.
The target tracepoint BTF type id is specified during loading time,
therefore we can get the function argument count from the function
prototype instead of the stack.
Signed-off-by: Menglong Dong <dongml2@chinatelecom.cn>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260121044348.113201-2-dongml2@chinatelecom.cn
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Inline bpf_get_current_task() and bpf_get_current_task_btf() for x86_64
to obtain better performance.
Signed-off-by: Menglong Dong <dongml2@chinatelecom.cn>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260120070555.233486-2-dongml2@chinatelecom.cn
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Add check to ensure that ARG_PTR_TO_MEM is used with either MEM_WRITE or
MEM_RDONLY.
Using ARG_PTR_TO_MEM alone without flags does not make sense because:
- If the helper does not change the argument, missing MEM_RDONLY causes the
verifier to incorrectly reject a read-only buffer.
- If the helper does change the argument, missing MEM_WRITE causes the
verifier to incorrectly assume the memory is unchanged, leading to errors
in code optimization.
Co-developed-by: Shuran Liu <electronlsr@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Shuran Liu <electronlsr@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Peili Gao <gplhust955@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peili Gao <gplhust955@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Haoran Ni <haoran.ni.cs@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Haoran Ni <haoran.ni.cs@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Zesen Liu <ftyghome@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260120-helper_proto-v3-2-27b0180b4e77@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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This patch implements range tracking (interval analysis) for BPF_DIV and
BPF_MOD operations when the divisor is a constant, covering both signed
and unsigned variants.
While LLVM typically optimizes integer division and modulo by constants
into multiplication and shift sequences, this optimization is less
effective for the BPF target when dealing with 64-bit arithmetic.
Currently, the verifier does not track bounds for scalar division or
modulo, treating the result as "unbounded". This leads to false positive
rejections for safe code patterns.
For example, the following code (compiled with -O2):
```c
int test(struct pt_regs *ctx) {
char buffer[6] = {1};
__u64 x = bpf_ktime_get_ns();
__u64 res = x % sizeof(buffer);
char value = buffer[res];
bpf_printk("res = %llu, val = %d", res, value);
return 0;
}
```
Generates a raw `BPF_MOD64` instruction:
```asm
; __u64 res = x % sizeof(buffer);
1: 97 00 00 00 06 00 00 00 r0 %= 0x6
; char value = buffer[res];
2: 18 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 r1 = 0x0 ll
4: 0f 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 r1 += r0
5: 91 14 00 00 00 00 00 00 r4 = *(s8 *)(r1 + 0x0)
```
Without this patch, the verifier fails with "math between map_value
pointer and register with unbounded min value is not allowed" because
it cannot deduce that `r0` is within [0, 5].
According to the BPF instruction set[1], the instruction's offset field
(`insn->off`) is used to distinguish between signed (`off == 1`) and
unsigned division (`off == 0`). Moreover, we also follow the BPF division
and modulo runtime behavior (semantics) to handle special cases, such as
division by zero and signed division overflow.
- UDIV: dst = (src != 0) ? (dst / src) : 0
- SDIV: dst = (src == 0) ? 0 : ((src == -1 && dst == LLONG_MIN) ? LLONG_MIN : (dst / src))
- UMOD: dst = (src != 0) ? (dst % src) : dst
- SMOD: dst = (src == 0) ? dst : ((src == -1 && dst == LLONG_MIN) ? 0: (dst s% src))
Here is the overview of the changes made in this patch (See the code comments
for more details and examples):
1. For BPF_DIV: Firstly check whether the divisor is zero. If so, set the
destination register to zero (matching runtime behavior).
For non-zero constant divisors: goto `scalar(32)?_min_max_(u|s)div` functions.
- General cases: compute the new range by dividing max_dividend and
min_dividend by the constant divisor.
- Overflow case (SIGNED_MIN / -1) in signed division: mark the result
as unbounded if the dividend is not a single number.
2. For BPF_MOD: Firstly check whether the divisor is zero. If so, leave the
destination register unchanged (matching runtime behavior).
For non-zero constant divisors: goto `scalar(32)?_min_max_(u|s)mod` functions.
- General case: For signed modulo, the result's sign matches the
dividend's sign. And the result's absolute value is strictly bounded
by `min(abs(dividend), abs(divisor) - 1)`.
- Special care is taken when the divisor is SIGNED_MIN. By casting
to unsigned before negation and subtracting 1, we avoid signed
overflow and correctly calculate the maximum possible magnitude
(`res_max_abs` in the code).
- "Small dividend" case: If the dividend is already within the possible
result range (e.g., [-2, 5] % 10), the operation is an identity
function, and the destination register remains unchanged.
3. In `scalar(32)?_min_max_(u|s)(div|mod)` functions: After updating current
range, reset other ranges and tnum to unbounded/unknown.
e.g., in `scalar_min_max_sdiv`, signed 64-bit range is updated. Then reset
unsigned 64-bit range and 32-bit range to unbounded, and tnum to unknown.
Exception: in BPF_MOD's "small dividend" case, since the result remains
unchanged, we do not reset other ranges/tnum.
4. Also updated existing selftests based on the expected BPF_DIV and
BPF_MOD behavior.
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/bpf/standardization/instruction-set.rst
Co-developed-by: Shenghao Yuan <shenghaoyuan0928@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Shenghao Yuan <shenghaoyuan0928@163.com>
Co-developed-by: Tianci Cao <ziye@zju.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Tianci Cao <ziye@zju.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Yazhou Tang <tangyazhou518@outlook.com>
Tested-by: syzbot@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260119085458.182221-2-tangyazhou@zju.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
|
Now that all the __prog suffix users in the kernel tree migrated to
KF_IMPLICIT_ARGS, remove it from the verifier.
See prior discussion for context [1].
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAEf4BzbgPfRm9BX=TsZm-TsHFAHcwhPY4vTt=9OT-uhWqf8tqw@mail.gmail.com/
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ihor Solodrai <ihor.solodrai@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260120222638.3976562-13-ihor.solodrai@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
|
Implement bpf_task_work_schedule_* with an implicit bpf_prog_aux
argument, and remove corresponding _impl funcs from the kernel.
Update special kfunc checks in the verifier accordingly.
Update the selftests to use the new API with implicit argument.
Reviewed-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ihor Solodrai <ihor.solodrai@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260120222638.3976562-10-ihor.solodrai@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
|
Implement bpf_wq_set_callback() with an implicit bpf_prog_aux
argument, and remove bpf_wq_set_callback_impl().
Update special kfunc checks in the verifier accordingly.
Reviewed-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ihor Solodrai <ihor.solodrai@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260120222638.3976562-8-ihor.solodrai@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
|
A kernel function bpf_foo marked with KF_IMPLICIT_ARGS flag is
expected to have two associated types in BTF:
* `bpf_foo` with a function prototype that omits implicit arguments
* `bpf_foo_impl` with a function prototype that matches the kernel
declaration of `bpf_foo`, but doesn't have a ksym associated with
its name
In order to support kfuncs with implicit arguments, the verifier has
to know how to resolve a call of `bpf_foo` to the correct BTF function
prototype and address.
To implement this, in add_kfunc_call() kfunc flags are checked for
KF_IMPLICIT_ARGS. For such kfuncs a BTF func prototype is adjusted to
the one found for `bpf_foo_impl` (func_name + "_impl" suffix, by
convention) function in BTF.
This effectively changes the signature of the `bpf_foo` kfunc in the
context of verification: from one without implicit args to the one
with full argument list.
The values of implicit arguments by design are provided by the
verifier, and so they can only be of particular types. In this patch
the only allowed implicit arg type is a pointer to struct
bpf_prog_aux.
In order for the verifier to correctly set an implicit bpf_prog_aux
arg value at runtime, is_kfunc_arg_prog() is extended to check for the
arg type. At a point when prog arg is determined in check_kfunc_args()
the kfunc with implicit args already has a prototype with full
argument list, so the existing value patch mechanism just works.
If a new kfunc with KF_IMPLICIT_ARG is declared for an existing kfunc
that uses a __prog argument (a legacy case), the prototype
substitution works in exactly the same way, assuming the kfunc follows
the _impl naming convention. The difference is only in how _impl
prototype is added to the BTF, which is not the verifier's
concern. See a subsequent resolve_btfids patch for details.
__prog suffix is still supported at this point, but will be removed in
a subsequent patch, after current users are moved to KF_IMPLICIT_ARGS.
Introduction of KF_IMPLICIT_ARGS revealed an issue with zero-extension
tracking, because an explicit rX = 0 in place of the verifier-supplied
argument is now absent if the arg is implicit (the BPF prog doesn't
pass a dummy NULL anymore). To mitigate this, reset the subreg_def of
all caller saved registers in check_kfunc_call() [1].
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/b4a760ef828d40dac7ea6074d39452bb0dc82caa.camel@gmail.com/
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ihor Solodrai <ihor.solodrai@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260120222638.3976562-4-ihor.solodrai@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
|
There is code duplication between add_kfunc_call() and
fetch_kfunc_meta() collecting information about a kfunc from BTF.
Introduce struct bpf_kfunc_meta to hold common kfunc BTF data and
implement fetch_kfunc_meta() to fill it in, instead of struct
bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta directly.
Then use these in add_kfunc_call() and (new) fetch_kfunc_arg_meta()
functions, and fixup previous usages of fetch_kfunc_meta() to
fetch_kfunc_arg_meta().
Besides the code dedup, this change enables add_kfunc_call() to access
kfunc->flags.
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ihor Solodrai <ihor.solodrai@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260120222638.3976562-3-ihor.solodrai@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
|
btf_kfunc_id_set_contains() is called by fetch_kfunc_meta() in the BPF
verifier to get the kfunc flags stored in the .BTF_ids ELF section.
If it returns NULL instead of a valid pointer, it's interpreted as an
illegal kfunc usage failing the verification.
There are two potential reasons for btf_kfunc_id_set_contains() to
return NULL:
1. Provided kfunc BTF id is not present in relevant kfunc id sets.
2. The kfunc is not allowed, as determined by the program type
specific filter [1].
The filter functions accept a pointer to `struct bpf_prog`, so they
might implicitly depend on earlier stages of verification, when
bpf_prog members are set.
For example, bpf_qdisc_kfunc_filter() in linux/net/sched/bpf_qdisc.c
inspects prog->aux->st_ops [2], which is initialized in:
check_attach_btf_id() -> check_struct_ops_btf_id()
So far this hasn't been an issue, because fetch_kfunc_meta() is the
only caller of btf_kfunc_id_set_contains().
However in subsequent patches of this series it is necessary to
inspect kfunc flags earlier in BPF verifier, in the add_kfunc_call().
To resolve this, refactor btf_kfunc_id_set_contains() into two
interface functions:
* btf_kfunc_flags() that simply returns pointer to kfunc_flags
without applying the filters
* btf_kfunc_is_allowed() that both checks for kfunc_flags existence
(which is a requirement for a kfunc to be allowed) and applies the
prog filters
See [3] for the previous version of this patch.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230519225157.760788-7-aditi.ghag@isovalent.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250409214606.2000194-4-ameryhung@gmail.com/
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20251029190113.3323406-3-ihor.solodrai@linux.dev/
Reviewed-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ihor Solodrai <ihor.solodrai@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260120222638.3976562-2-ihor.solodrai@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
|
Currently, reset_idmap_scratch() performs a 4.7KB memset() in every
states_equal() call. Optimize this by using a counter to track used
ID mappings, replacing the O(N) memset() with an O(1) reset and
bounding the search loop in check_ids().
Signed-off-by: Qiliang Yuan <realwujing@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260120023234.77673-1-realwujing@gmail.com
|
|
sync_linked_regs() is called after a conditional jump to propagate new
bounds of a register to all its liked registers. But the verifier log
only prints the state of the register that is part of the conditional
jump.
Make sync_linked_regs() scratch the registers whose bounds have been
updated by propagation from a known register.
Before:
0: (85) call bpf_get_prandom_u32#7 ; R0=scalar()
1: (57) r0 &= 255 ; R0=scalar(smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=255,var_off=(0x0; 0xff))
2: (bf) r1 = r0 ; R0=scalar(id=1,smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=255,var_off=(0x0; 0xff)) R1=scalar(id=1,smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=255,var_off=(0x0; 0xff))
3: (07) r1 += 4 ; R1=scalar(id=1+4,smin=umin=smin32=umin32=4,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=259,var_off=(0x0; 0x1ff))
4: (a5) if r1 < 0xa goto pc+2 ; R1=scalar(id=1+4,smin=umin=smin32=umin32=10,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=259,var_off=(0x0; 0x1ff))
5: (35) if r0 >= 0x6 goto pc+1
After:
0: (85) call bpf_get_prandom_u32#7 ; R0=scalar()
1: (57) r0 &= 255 ; R0=scalar(smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=255,var_off=(0x0; 0xff))
2: (bf) r1 = r0 ; R0=scalar(id=1,smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=255,var_off=(0x0; 0xff)) R1=scalar(id=1,smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=255,var_off=(0x0; 0xff))
3: (07) r1 += 4 ; R1=scalar(id=1+4,smin=umin=smin32=umin32=4,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=259,var_off=(0x0; 0x1ff))
4: (a5) if r1 < 0xa goto pc+2 ; R0=scalar(id=1+0,smin=umin=smin32=umin32=6,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=255) R1=scalar(id=1+4,smin=umin=smin32=umin32=10,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=259,var_off=(0x0; 0x1ff))
5: (35) if r0 >= 0x6 goto pc+1
The conditional jump in 4 updates the bound of R1 and the new bounds are
propogated to R0 as it is linked with the same id, before this change,
verifier only printed the state for R1 but after it prints for both R0
and R1.
Suggested-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260116141436.3715322-1-puranjay@kernel.org
|
|
sync_linked_regs() copies the id of known_reg to reg when propagating
bounds of known_reg to reg using the off of known_reg, but when
known_reg was linked to reg like:
known_reg = reg ; both known_reg and reg get same id
known_reg += 4 ; known_reg gets off = 4, and its id gets BPF_ADD_CONST
now when a call to sync_linked_regs() happens, let's say with the following:
if known_reg >= 10 goto pc+2
known_reg's new bounds are propagated to reg but now reg gets
BPF_ADD_CONST from the copy.
This means if another link to reg is created like:
another_reg = reg ; another_reg should get the id of reg but
assign_scalar_id_before_mov() sees
BPF_ADD_CONST on reg and assigns a new id to it.
As reg has a new id now, known_reg's link to reg is broken. If we find
new bounds for known_reg, they will not be propagated to reg.
This can be seen in the selftest added in the next commit:
0: (85) call bpf_get_prandom_u32#7 ; R0=scalar()
1: (57) r0 &= 255 ; R0=scalar(smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=255,var_off=(0x0; 0xff))
2: (bf) r1 = r0 ; R0=scalar(id=1,smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=255,var_off=(0x0; 0xff)) R1=scalar(id=1,smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=255,var_off=(0x0; 0xff))
3: (07) r1 += 4 ; R1=scalar(id=1+4,smin=umin=smin32=umin32=4,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=259,var_off=(0x0; 0x1ff))
4: (a5) if r1 < 0xa goto pc+4 ; R1=scalar(id=1+4,smin=umin=smin32=umin32=10,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=259,var_off=(0x0; 0x1ff))
5: (bf) r2 = r0 ; R0=scalar(id=2,smin=umin=smin32=umin32=6,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=255) R2=scalar(id=2,smin=umin=smin32=umin32=6,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=255)
6: (a5) if r1 < 0xe goto pc+2 ; R1=scalar(id=1+4,smin=umin=smin32=umin32=14,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=259,var_off=(0x0; 0x1ff))
7: (35) if r0 >= 0xa goto pc+1 ; R0=scalar(id=2,smin=umin=smin32=umin32=6,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=9,var_off=(0x0; 0xf))
8: (37) r0 /= 0
div by zero
When 4 is verified, r1's bounds are propagated to r0 but r0 also gets
BPF_ADD_CONST (bug).
When 5 is verified, r0 gets a new id (2) and its link with r1 is broken.
After 6 we know r1 has bounds [14, 259] and therefore r0 should have
bounds [10, 255], therefore the branch at 7 is always taken. But because
r0's id was changed to 2, r1's new bounds are not propagated to r0.
The verifier still thinks r0 has bounds [6, 255] before 7 and execution
can reach div by zero.
Fix this by preserving id in sync_linked_regs() like off and subreg_def.
Fixes: 98d7ca374ba4 ("bpf: Track delta between "linked" registers.")
Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260115151143.1344724-2-puranjay@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
|
For a `gotox rX` instruction the rX register should be marked as used
in the compute_insn_live_regs() function. Fix this.
Signed-off-by: Anton Protopopov <a.s.protopopov@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260114162544.83253-2-a.s.protopopov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
|
Cross-merge BPF and other fixes after downstream PR.
No conflicts.
Adjacent:
Auto-merging MAINTAINERS
Auto-merging Makefile
Auto-merging kernel/bpf/verifier.c
Auto-merging kernel/sched/ext.c
Auto-merging mm/memcontrol.c
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
|
Teach the BPF verifier to treat pointers to struct types returned from
BPF kfuncs as implicitly trusted (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED) by
default. Returning untrusted pointers to struct types from BPF kfuncs
should be considered an exception only, and certainly not the norm.
Update existing selftests to reflect the change in register type
printing (e.g. `ptr_` becoming `trusted_ptr_` in verifier error
messages).
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/aV4nbCaMfIoM0awM@google.com/
Signed-off-by: Matt Bobrowski <mattbobrowski@google.com>
Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260113083949.2502978-1-mattbobrowski@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
|
Currently, vmlinux and kernel module BTFs are unconditionally
sorted during the build phase, with named types placed at the
end. Thus, anonymous types should be skipped when starting the
search. In my vmlinux BTF, the number of anonymous types is
61,747, which means the loop count can be reduced by 61,747.
Signed-off-by: Donglin Peng <pengdonglin@xiaomi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260109130003.3313716-9-dolinux.peng@gmail.com
|
|
The func_id parameter is not needed in check_func_proto.
This patch removes it.
Signed-off-by: Song Chen <chensong_2000@189.cn>
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260105155009.4581-1-chensong_2000@189.cn
|
|
cilium bpf_wiregard.bpf.c when compiled with -O1 fails to load
with the following verifier log:
192: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r10 -304) ; R2=pkt(r=40) R10=fp0 fp-304=pkt(r=40)
...
227: (85) call bpf_skb_store_bytes#9 ; R0=scalar()
228: (bc) w2 = w0 ; R0=scalar() R2=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=0xffffffff,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff))
229: (c4) w2 s>>= 31 ; R2=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=0xffffffff,smin32=-1,smax32=0,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff))
230: (54) w2 &= -134 ; R2=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=umax32=0xffffff7a,smax32=0x7fffff7a,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffff7a))
...
232: (66) if w2 s> 0xffffffff goto pc+125 ; R2=scalar(smin=umin=umin32=0x80000000,smax=umax=umax32=0xffffff7a,smax32=-134,var_off=(0x80000000; 0x7fffff7a))
...
238: (79) r4 = *(u64 *)(r10 -304) ; R4=scalar() R10=fp0 fp-304=scalar()
239: (56) if w2 != 0xffffff78 goto pc+210 ; R2=0xffffff78 // -136
...
258: (71) r1 = *(u8 *)(r4 +0)
R4 invalid mem access 'scalar'
The error might confuse most bpf authors, since fp-304 slot had 'pkt'
pointer at insn 192 and became 'scalar' at 238. That happened because
bpf_skb_store_bytes() clears all packet pointers including those in
the stack. On the first glance it might look like a bug in the source
code, since ctx->data pointer should have been reloaded after the call
to bpf_skb_store_bytes().
The relevant part of cilium source code looks like this:
// bpf/lib/nodeport.h
int dsr_set_ipip6()
{
if (ctx_adjust_hroom(...))
return DROP_INVALID; // -134
if (ctx_store_bytes(...))
return DROP_WRITE_ERROR; // -141
return 0;
}
bool dsr_fail_needs_reply(int code)
{
if (code == DROP_FRAG_NEEDED) // -136
return true;
return false;
}
tail_nodeport_ipv6_dsr()
{
ret = dsr_set_ipip6(...);
if (!IS_ERR(ret)) {
...
} else {
if (dsr_fail_needs_reply(ret))
return dsr_reply_icmp6(...);
}
}
The code doesn't have arithmetic shift by 31 and it reloads ctx->data
every time it needs to access it. So it's not a bug in the source code.
The reason is DAGCombiner::foldSelectCCToShiftAnd() LLVM transformation:
// If this is a select where the false operand is zero and the compare is a
// check of the sign bit, see if we can perform the "gzip trick":
// select_cc setlt X, 0, A, 0 -> and (sra X, size(X)-1), A
// select_cc setgt X, 0, A, 0 -> and (not (sra X, size(X)-1)), A
The conditional branch in dsr_set_ipip6() and its return values
are optimized into BPF_ARSH plus BPF_AND:
227: (85) call bpf_skb_store_bytes#9
228: (bc) w2 = w0
229: (c4) w2 s>>= 31 ; R2=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=0xffffffff,smin32=-1,smax32=0,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff))
230: (54) w2 &= -134 ; R2=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=umax32=0xffffff7a,smax32=0x7fffff7a,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffff7a))
after insn 230 the register w2 can only be 0 or -134,
but the verifier approximates it, since there is no way to
represent two scalars in bpf_reg_state.
After fallthough at insn 232 the w2 can only be -134,
hence the branch at insn
239: (56) if w2 != -136 goto pc+210
should be always taken, and trapping insn 258 should never execute.
LLVM generated correct code, but the verifier follows impossible
path and rejects valid program. To fix this issue recognize this
special LLVM optimization and fork the verifier state.
So after insn 229: (c4) w2 s>>= 31
the verifier has two states to explore:
one with w2 = 0 and another with w2 = 0xffffffff
which makes the verifier accept bpf_wiregard.c
A similar pattern exists were OR operation is used in place of the AND
operation, the verifier detects that pattern as well by forking the
state before the OR operation with a scalar in range [-1,0].
Note there are 20+ such patterns in bpf_wiregard.o compiled
with -O1 and -O2, but they're rarely seen in other production
bpf programs, so push_stack() approach is not a concern.
Reported-by: Hao Sun <sunhao.th@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Co-developed-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260112201424.816836-2-puranjay@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Replace the pattern of declaring a local regs array from cur_regs()
and then indexing into it with the more concise reg_state() helper.
This simplifies the code by eliminating intermediate variables and
makes register access more consistent throughout the verifier.
Signed-off-by: Mykyta Yatsenko <yatsenko@meta.com>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260113134826.2214860-1-mykyta.yatsenko5@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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BPF_MAP_TYPE_INSN_ARRAY maps store instruction pointers in their
ips array, not string data. The map_direct_value_addr callback for
this map type returns the address of the ips array, which is not
suitable for use as a constant string argument.
When a BPF program passes a pointer to an insn_array map value as
ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR (e.g., to bpf_snprintf), the verifier's
null-termination check in check_reg_const_str() operates on the
wrong memory region, and at runtime bpf_bprintf_prepare() can read
out of bounds searching for a null terminator.
Reject BPF_MAP_TYPE_INSN_ARRAY in check_reg_const_str() since this
map type is not designed to hold string data.
Reported-by: syzbot+2c29addf92581b410079@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=2c29addf92581b410079
Tested-by: syzbot+2c29addf92581b410079@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 493d9e0d6083 ("bpf, x86: add support for indirect jumps")
Signed-off-by: Deepanshu Kartikey <kartikey406@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Anton Protopopov <a.s.protopopov@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260107021037.289644-1-kartikey406@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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The bpf_arena_*_pages() kfuncs can be called from sleepable contexts,
but the verifier still prevents BPF programs from calling them while
holding a spinlock. Amend the verifier to allow for BPF programs
calling arena page management functions while holding a lock.
Signed-off-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260106-arena-under-lock-v2-2-378e9eab3066@etsalapatis.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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The in_sleepable_context() function is used to specialize the BPF code
in do_misc_fixups(). With the addition of nonsleepable arena kfuncs,
there are kfuncs whose specialization depends on whether we are
holding a lock. We should use the nonsleepable version while
holding a lock and the sleepable one when not.
Add a check for active_locks to account for locking when specializing
arena kfuncs.
Signed-off-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260106-arena-under-lock-v2-1-378e9eab3066@etsalapatis.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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The __opt annotation was originally introduced specifically for
buffer/size argument pairs in bpf_dynptr_slice() and
bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr(), allowing the buffer pointer to be NULL while
still validating the size as a constant. The __nullable annotation
serves the same purpose but is more general and is already used
throughout the BPF subsystem for raw tracepoints, struct_ops, and other
kfuncs.
This patch unifies the two annotations by replacing __opt with
__nullable. The key change is in the verifier's
get_kfunc_ptr_arg_type() function, where mem/size pair detection is now
performed before the nullable check. This ensures that buffer/size
pairs are correctly classified as KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE even when the
buffer is nullable, while adding an !arg_mem_size condition to the
nullable check prevents interference with mem/size pair handling.
When processing KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE arguments, the verifier now uses
is_kfunc_arg_nullable() instead of the removed is_kfunc_arg_optional()
to determine whether to skip size validation for NULL buffers.
This is the first documentation added for the __nullable annotation,
which has been in use since it was introduced but was previously
undocumented.
No functional changes to verifier behavior - nullable buffer/size pairs
continue to work exactly as before.
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260102221513.1961781-1-puranjay@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Now that KF_TRUSTED_ARGS is the default for all kfuncs, remove the
explicit KF_TRUSTED_ARGS flag from all kfunc definitions and remove the
flag itself.
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>
Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260102180038.2708325-3-puranjay@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Change the verifier to make trusted args the default requirement for
all kfuncs by removing is_kfunc_trusted_args() assuming it be to always
return true.
This works because:
1. Context pointers (xdp_md, __sk_buff, etc.) are handled through their
own KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX case label and bypass the trusted check
2. Struct_ops callback arguments are already marked as PTR_TRUSTED during
initialization and pass is_trusted_reg()
3. KF_RCU kfuncs are handled separately via is_kfunc_rcu() checks at
call sites (always checked with || alongside is_kfunc_trusted_args)
This simple change makes all kfuncs require trusted args by default
while maintaining correct behavior for all existing special cases.
Note: This change means kfuncs that previously accepted NULL pointers
without KF_TRUSTED_ARGS will now reject NULL at verification time.
Several netfilter kfuncs are affected: bpf_xdp_ct_lookup(),
bpf_skb_ct_lookup(), bpf_xdp_ct_alloc(), and bpf_skb_ct_alloc() all
accept NULL for their bpf_tuple and opts parameters internally (checked
in __bpf_nf_ct_lookup), but after this change the verifier rejects NULL
before the kfunc is even called. This is acceptable because these kfuncs
don't work with NULL parameters in their proper usage. Now they will be
rejected rather than returning an error, which shouldn't make a
difference to BPF programs that were using these kfuncs properly.
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>
Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260102180038.2708325-2-puranjay@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Within an iterator or callback based loop, it should be safe to prune
the current state if the old state stack slot is marked as
STACK_INVALID or STACK_MISC:
- either all branches of the old state lead to a program exit;
- or some branch of the old state leads the current state.
This is the same logic as applied in non-loop cases when
states_equal() is called in NOT_EXACT mode.
The test case that exercises stacksafe() and demonstrates the
difference in verification performance is included in the next patch.
I'm not sure if it is possible to prepare a test case that exercises
regsafe(); it appears that the compute_live_registers() pass makes
this impossible.
Nevertheless, for code readability reasons, I think that stacksafe()
and regsafe() should handle STACK_INVALID / NOT_INIT symmetrically.
Hence, this commit changes both functions.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251230-loop-stack-misc-pruning-v1-1-585cfd6cec51@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Calls like bpf_loop() or bpf_for_each_map_elem() introduce loops that
are not explicitly present in the control-flow graph. The verifier
processes such calls by repeatedly interpreting the callback function
body within the same verification path (until the current state
converges with a previous state).
Such loops require a bpf_scc_visit instance in order to allow the
accumulation of the state graph backedges. Otherwise, certain
checkpoint states created within the bodies of such loops will have
incomplete precision marks.
See the next patch for an example of a program that leads to the
verifier accepting an unsafe program.
Fixes: 96c6aa4c63af ("bpf: compute SCCs in program control flow graph")
Fixes: c9e31900b54c ("bpf: propagate read/precision marks over state graph backedges")
Reported-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251229-scc-for-callbacks-v1-1-ceadfe679900@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Make arena related kfuncs any context safe by the following changes:
bpf_arena_alloc_pages() and bpf_arena_reserve_pages():
Replace the usage of the mutex with a rqspinlock for range tree and use
kmalloc_nolock() wherever needed. Use free_pages_nolock() to free pages
from any context.
apply_range_set/clear_cb() with apply_to_page_range() has already made
populating the vm_area in bpf_arena_alloc_pages() any context safe.
bpf_arena_free_pages(): defer the main logic to a workqueue if it is
called from a non-sleepable context.
specialize_kfunc() is used to replace the sleepable arena_free_pages()
with bpf_arena_free_pages_non_sleepable() when the verifier detects the
call is from a non-sleepable context.
In the non-sleepable case, arena_free_pages() queues the address and the
page count to be freed to a lock-less list of struct arena_free_spans
and raises an irq_work. The irq_work handler calls schedules_work() as
it is safe to be called from irq context. arena_free_worker() (the work
queue handler) iterates these spans and clears ptes, flushes tlb, zaps
pages, and calls __free_page().
Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251222195022.431211-4-puranjay@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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The verifier currently limits direct offsets into a map to 512MiB
to avoid overflow during pointer arithmetic. However, this prevents
arena maps from using direct addressing instructions to access data
at the end of > 512MiB arena maps. This is necessary when moving
arena globals to the end of the arena instead of the front.
Refactor the verifier code to remove the offset calculation during
direct value access calculations. This is possible because the only
two map types that implement .map_direct_value_addr() are arrays and
arenas, and they both do their own internal checks to ensure the
offset is within bounds.
Adjust selftests that expect the old error. These tests still fail
because the verifier identifies the access as out of bounds for the
map, so change them to expect an "invalid access to map value pointer"
error instead.
Signed-off-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20251216173325.98465-3-emil@etsalapatis.com
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