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The PCIe 7.0 specification, section 11, defines the Trusted Execution
Environment (TEE) Device Interface Security Protocol (TDISP). This
protocol definition builds upon Component Measurement and Authentication
(CMA), and link Integrity and Data Encryption (IDE). It adds support for
assigning devices (PCI physical or virtual function) to a confidential VM
such that the assigned device is enabled to access guest private memory
protected by technologies like Intel TDX, AMD SEV-SNP, RISCV COVE, or ARM
CCA.
The "TSM" (TEE Security Manager) is a concept in the TDISP specification
of an agent that mediates between a "DSM" (Device Security Manager) and
system software in both a VMM and a confidential VM. A VMM uses TSM ABIs
to setup link security and assign devices. A confidential VM uses TSM
ABIs to transition an assigned device into the TDISP "RUN" state and
validate its configuration. From a Linux perspective the TSM abstracts
many of the details of TDISP, IDE, and CMA. Some of those details leak
through at times, but for the most part TDISP is an internal
implementation detail of the TSM.
CONFIG_PCI_TSM adds an "authenticated" attribute and "tsm/" subdirectory
to pci-sysfs. Consider that the TSM driver may itself be a PCI driver.
Userspace can watch for the arrival of a "TSM" device,
/sys/class/tsm/tsm0/uevent KOBJ_CHANGE, to know when the PCI core has
initialized TSM services.
The operations that can be executed against a PCI device are split into
two mutually exclusive operation sets, "Link" and "Security" (struct
pci_tsm_{link,security}_ops). The "Link" operations manage physical link
security properties and communication with the device's Device Security
Manager firmware. These are the host side operations in TDISP. The
"Security" operations coordinate the security state of the assigned
virtual device (TDI). These are the guest side operations in TDISP.
Only "link" (Secure Session and physical Link Encryption) operations are
defined at this stage. There are placeholders for the device security
(Trusted Computing Base entry / exit) operations.
The locking allows for multiple devices to be executing commands
simultaneously, one outstanding command per-device and an rwsem
synchronizes the implementation relative to TSM registration/unregistration
events.
Thanks to Wu Hao for his work on an early draft of this support.
Cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Cc: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@rivosinc.com>
Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <jonathan.cameron@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251031212902.2256310-5-dan.j.williams@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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The PCI core has just been amended to create a pci_doe_mb struct for
every DOE instance on device enumeration. CXL (the only in-tree DOE
user so far) has been migrated to use those mailboxes instead of
creating its own.
That leaves pcim_doe_create_mb() and pci_doe_for_each_off() without any
callers, so drop them.
pci_doe_supports_prot() is now only used internally, so declare it
static.
pci_doe_destroy_mb() is no longer used as callback for
devm_add_action(), so refactor it to accept a struct pci_doe_mb pointer
instead of a generic void pointer.
Because pci_doe_create_mb() is only called on device enumeration, i.e.
before driver binding, the workqueue name never contains a driver name.
So replace dev_driver_string() with dev_bus_name() when generating the
workqueue name.
Tested-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Reviewed-by: Ming Li <ming4.li@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/64f614b6584982986c55d2c6229b4ee2b276dd59.1678543498.git.lukas@wunner.de
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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Currently a DOE instance cannot be shared by multiple drivers because
each driver creates its own pci_doe_mb struct for a given DOE instance.
For the same reason a DOE instance cannot be shared between the PCI core
and a driver.
Moreover, finding out which protocols a DOE instance supports requires
creating a pci_doe_mb for it. If a device has multiple DOE instances,
a driver looking for a specific protocol may need to create a pci_doe_mb
for each of the device's DOE instances and then destroy those which
do not support the desired protocol. That's obviously an inefficient
way to do things.
Overcome these issues by creating mailboxes in the PCI core on device
enumeration.
Provide a pci_find_doe_mailbox() API call to allow drivers to get a
pci_doe_mb for a given (pci_dev, vendor, protocol) triple. This API is
modeled after pci_find_capability() and can later be amended with a
pci_find_next_doe_mailbox() call to iterate over all mailboxes of a
given pci_dev which support a specific protocol.
On removal, destroy the mailboxes in pci_destroy_dev(), after the driver
is unbound. This allows drivers to use DOE in their ->remove() hook.
On surprise removal, cancel ongoing DOE exchanges and prevent new ones
from being scheduled. Thereby ensure that a hot-removed device doesn't
needlessly wait for a running exchange to time out.
Tested-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Reviewed-by: Ming Li <ming4.li@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/40a6f973f72ef283d79dd55e7e6fddc7481199af.1678543498.git.lukas@wunner.de
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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A synchronous API for DOE has just been introduced. CXL (the only
in-tree DOE user so far) was converted to use it instead of the
asynchronous API.
Consequently, pci_doe_submit_task() as well as the pci_doe_task struct
are only used internally, so make them private.
Tested-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Reviewed-by: Ming Li <ming4.li@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/cc19544068483681e91dfe27545c2180cd09f931.1678543498.git.lukas@wunner.de
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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The DOE API only allows asynchronous exchanges and forces callers to
provide a completion callback. Yet all existing callers only perform
synchronous exchanges. Upcoming commits for CMA (Component Measurement
and Authentication, PCIe r6.0 sec 6.31) likewise require only
synchronous DOE exchanges.
Provide a synchronous pci_doe() API call which builds on the internal
asynchronous machinery.
Convert the internal pci_doe_discovery() to the new call.
The new API allows submission of const-declared requests, necessitating
the addition of a const qualifier in struct pci_doe_task.
Tested-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Reviewed-by: Ming Li <ming4.li@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0f444206da9615c56301fbaff459c0f45d27f122.1678543498.git.lukas@wunner.de
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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The CDAT exposed in sysfs differs between little endian and big endian
arches: On big endian, every 4 bytes are byte-swapped.
PCI Configuration Space is little endian (PCI r3.0 sec 6.1). Accessors
such as pci_read_config_dword() implicitly swap bytes on big endian.
That way, the macros in include/uapi/linux/pci_regs.h work regardless of
the arch's endianness. For an example of implicit byte-swapping, see
ppc4xx_pciex_read_config(), which calls in_le32(), which uses lwbrx
(Load Word Byte-Reverse Indexed).
DOE Read/Write Data Mailbox Registers are unlike other registers in
Configuration Space in that they contain or receive a 4 byte portion of
an opaque byte stream (a "Data Object" per PCIe r6.0 sec 7.9.24.5f).
They need to be copied to or from the request/response buffer verbatim.
So amend pci_doe_send_req() and pci_doe_recv_resp() to undo the implicit
byte-swapping.
The CXL_DOE_TABLE_ACCESS_* and PCI_DOE_DATA_OBJECT_DISC_* macros assume
implicit byte-swapping. Byte-swap requests after constructing them with
those macros and byte-swap responses before parsing them.
Change the request and response type to __le32 to avoid sparse warnings.
Per a request from Jonathan, replace sizeof(u32) with sizeof(__le32) for
consistency.
Fixes: c97006046c79 ("cxl/port: Read CDAT table")
Tested-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.0+
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/3051114102f41d19df3debbee123129118fc5e6d.1678543498.git.lukas@wunner.de
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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Introduced in a PCIe r6.0, sec 6.30, DOE provides a config space based
mailbox with standard protocol discovery. Each mailbox is accessed
through a DOE Extended Capability.
Each DOE mailbox must support the DOE discovery protocol in addition to
any number of additional protocols.
Define core PCIe functionality to manage a single PCIe DOE mailbox at a
defined config space offset. Functionality includes iterating,
creating, query of supported protocol, and task submission. Destruction
of the mailboxes is device managed.
Cc: "Li, Ming" <ming4.li@intel.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <helgaas@kernel.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <helgaas@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Co-developed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220719205249.566684-4-ira.weiny@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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