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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull misc x86 updates from Dave Hansen:
"The most significant are some changes to ensure that symbols exported
for KVM are used only by KVM modules themselves, along with some
related cleanups.
In true x86/misc fashion, the other patch is completely unrelated and
just enhances an existing pr_warn() to make it clear to users how they
have tainted their kernel when something is mucking with MSRs.
Summary:
- Make MSR-induced taint easier for users to track down
- Restrict KVM-specific exports to KVM itself"
* tag 'x86_misc_for_6.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86: Restrict KVM-induced symbol exports to KVM modules where obvious/possible
x86/mm: Drop unnecessary export of "ptdump_walk_pgd_level_debugfs"
x86/mtrr: Drop unnecessary export of "mtrr_state"
x86/bugs: Drop unnecessary export of "x86_spec_ctrl_base"
x86/msr: Add CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC taint name to "unrecognized" pr_warn(msg)
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The basic idea is to have __WARN_printf() be a vararg function such
that the compiler can do the optimal calling convention for us. This
function body will be a #UD and then set up a va_list in the exception
from pt_regs.
But because the trap will be in a called function, the bug_entry must
be passed in. Have that be the first argument, with the format tucked
away inside the bug_entry.
The comments should clarify the real fun details.
The big downside is that all WARNs will now show:
RIP: 0010:__WARN_trap:+0
One possible solution is to simply discard the top frame when
unwinding. A follow up patch takes care of this slightly differently
by abusing the x86 static_call implementation.
This changes (with the next patches):
WARN_ONCE(preempt_count() != 2*PREEMPT_DISABLE_OFFSET,
"corrupted preempt_count: %s/%d/0x%x\n",
from:
cmpl $2, %ecx #, _7
jne .L1472
...
.L1472:
cmpb $0, __already_done.11(%rip)
je .L1513
...
.L1513
movb $1, __already_done.11(%rip)
movl 1424(%r14), %edx # _15->pid, _15->pid
leaq 1912(%r14), %rsi #, _17
movq $.LC43, %rdi #,
call __warn_printk #
ud2
.pushsection __bug_table,"aw"
2:
.long 1b - . # bug_entry::bug_addr
.long .LC1 - . # bug_entry::file
.word 5093 # bug_entry::line
.word 2313 # bug_entry::flags
.org 2b + 12
.popsection
.pushsection .discard.annotate_insn,"M", @progbits, 8
.long 1b - .
.long 8 # ANNOTYPE_REACHABLE
.popsection
into:
cmpl $2, %ecx #, _7
jne .L1442 #,
...
.L1442:
lea (2f)(%rip), %rdi
1:
.pushsection __bug_table,"aw"
2:
.long 1b - . # bug_entry::bug_addr
.long .LC43 - . # bug_entry::format
.long .LC1 - . # bug_entry::file
.word 5093 # bug_entry::line
.word 2323 # bug_entry::flags
.org 2b + 16
.popsection
movl 1424(%r14), %edx # _19->pid, _19->pid
leaq 1912(%r14), %rsi #, _13
ud1 (%edx), %rdi
Notably, by pushing everything into the exception handler it can take
care of the ONCE thing.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251110115758.213813530@infradead.org
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Extend KVM's export macro framework to provide EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(),
and use the helper macro to export symbols for KVM throughout x86 if and
only if KVM will build one or more modules, and only for those modules.
To avoid unnecessary exports when CONFIG_KVM=m but kvm.ko will not be
built (because no vendor modules are selected), let arch code #define
EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM to suppress/override the exports.
Note, the set of symbols to restrict to KVM was generated by manual search
and audit; any "misses" are due to human error, not some grand plan.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Tested-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251112173944.1380633-5-seanjc%40google.com
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It will be used by other x86 mitigations.
No functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
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write_ibpb() does IBPB, which (among other things) flushes branch type
predictions on AMD. If the CPU has SRSO_NO, or if the SRSO mitigation
has been disabled, branch type flushing isn't needed, in which case the
lighter-weight SBPB can be used.
The 'x86_pred_cmd' variable already keeps track of whether IBPB or SBPB
should be used. Use that instead of hardcoding IBPB.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/17c5dcd14b29199b75199d67ff7758de9d9a4928.1744148254.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
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There's nothing entry-specific about entry_ibpb(). In preparation for
calling it from elsewhere, rename it to write_ibpb().
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1e54ace131e79b760de3fe828264e26d0896e3ac.1744148254.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
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The __ref_stack_chk_guard symbol doesn't exist on UP:
<stdin>:4:15: error: ‘__ref_stack_chk_guard’ undeclared here (not in a function)
Fix the #ifdef around the entry.S export.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250123190747.745588-8-brgerst@gmail.com
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Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Older versions of GCC fixed the location of the stack protector canary
at %gs:40. This constraint forced the percpu section to be linked at
absolute address 0 so that the canary could be the first data object in
the percpu section. Supporting the zero-based percpu section requires
additional code to handle relocations for RIP-relative references to
percpu data, extra complexity to kallsyms, and workarounds for linker
bugs due to the use of absolute symbols.
GCC 8.1 supports redefining where the canary is located, allowing it to
become a normal percpu variable instead of at a fixed location. This
removes the constraint that the percpu section must be zero-based.
Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250123190747.745588-8-brgerst@gmail.com
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With the introduction of kCFI the addition of ENDBR to
SYM_FUNC_START* no longer suffices to make the function indirectly
callable. This now requires the use of SYM_TYPED_FUNC_START.
As such, remove the implicit ENDBR from SYM_FUNC_START* and add some
explicit annotations to fix things up again.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250207122546.409116003@infradead.org
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GCC and Clang both implement stack protector support based on Thread Local
Storage (TLS) variables, and this is used in the kernel to implement per-task
stack cookies, by copying a task's stack cookie into a per-CPU variable every
time it is scheduled in.
Both now also implement -mstack-protector-guard-symbol=, which permits the TLS
variable to be specified directly. This is useful because it will allow to
move away from using a fixed offset of 40 bytes into the per-CPU area on
x86_64, which requires a lot of special handling in the per-CPU code and the
runtime relocation code.
However, while GCC is rather lax in its implementation of this command line
option, Clang actually requires that the provided symbol name refers to a TLS
variable (i.e., one declared with __thread), although it also permits the
variable to be undeclared entirely, in which case it will use an implicit
declaration of the right type.
The upshot of this is that Clang will emit the correct references to the stack
cookie variable in most cases, e.g.,
10d: 64 a1 00 00 00 00 mov %fs:0x0,%eax
10f: R_386_32 __stack_chk_guard
However, if a non-TLS definition of the symbol in question is visible in the
same compilation unit (which amounts to the whole of vmlinux if LTO is
enabled), it will drop the per-CPU prefix and emit a load from a bogus
address.
Work around this by using a symbol name that never occurs in C code, and emit
it as an alias in the linker script.
Fixes: 3fb0fdb3bbe7 ("x86/stackprotector/32: Make the canary into a regular percpu variable")
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1854
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241105155801.1779119-2-brgerst@gmail.com
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entry_ibpb() should invalidate all indirect predictions, including return
target predictions. Not all IBPB implementations do this, in which case the
fallback is RSB filling.
Prevent SRSO-style hijacks of return predictions following IBPB, as the return
target predictor can be corrupted before the IBPB completes.
[ bp: Massage. ]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Wikner <kwikner@ethz.ch>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull core x86 updates from Ingo Molnar:
- The biggest change is the rework of the percpu code, to support the
'Named Address Spaces' GCC feature, by Uros Bizjak:
- This allows C code to access GS and FS segment relative memory
via variables declared with such attributes, which allows the
compiler to better optimize those accesses than the previous
inline assembly code.
- The series also includes a number of micro-optimizations for
various percpu access methods, plus a number of cleanups of %gs
accesses in assembly code.
- These changes have been exposed to linux-next testing for the
last ~5 months, with no known regressions in this area.
- Fix/clean up __switch_to()'s broken but accidentally working handling
of FPU switching - which also generates better code
- Propagate more RIP-relative addressing in assembly code, to generate
slightly better code
- Rework the CPU mitigations Kconfig space to be less idiosyncratic, to
make it easier for distros to follow & maintain these options
- Rework the x86 idle code to cure RCU violations and to clean up the
logic
- Clean up the vDSO Makefile logic
- Misc cleanups and fixes
* tag 'x86-core-2024-03-11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (52 commits)
x86/idle: Select idle routine only once
x86/idle: Let prefer_mwait_c1_over_halt() return bool
x86/idle: Cleanup idle_setup()
x86/idle: Clean up idle selection
x86/idle: Sanitize X86_BUG_AMD_E400 handling
sched/idle: Conditionally handle tick broadcast in default_idle_call()
x86: Increase brk randomness entropy for 64-bit systems
x86/vdso: Move vDSO to mmap region
x86/vdso/kbuild: Group non-standard build attributes and primary object file rules together
x86/vdso: Fix rethunk patching for vdso-image-{32,64}.o
x86/retpoline: Ensure default return thunk isn't used at runtime
x86/vdso: Use CONFIG_COMPAT_32 to specify vdso32
x86/vdso: Use $(addprefix ) instead of $(foreach )
x86/vdso: Simplify obj-y addition
x86/vdso: Consolidate targets and clean-files
x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_RETHUNK => CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK
x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_CPU_SRSO => CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO
x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY => CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY
x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY => CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY
x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_SLS => CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS
...
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MDS mitigation requires clearing the CPU buffers before returning to
user. This needs to be done late in the exit-to-user path. Current
location of VERW leaves a possibility of kernel data ending up in CPU
buffers for memory accesses done after VERW such as:
1. Kernel data accessed by an NMI between VERW and return-to-user can
remain in CPU buffers since NMI returning to kernel does not
execute VERW to clear CPU buffers.
2. Alyssa reported that after VERW is executed,
CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=y scrubs the stack used by a system
call. Memory accesses during stack scrubbing can move kernel stack
contents into CPU buffers.
3. When caller saved registers are restored after a return from
function executing VERW, the kernel stack accesses can remain in
CPU buffers(since they occur after VERW).
To fix this VERW needs to be moved very late in exit-to-user path.
In preparation for moving VERW to entry/exit asm code, create macros
that can be used in asm. Also make VERW patching depend on a new feature
flag X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF.
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <alyssa.milburn@intel.com>
Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240213-delay-verw-v8-1-a6216d83edb7%40linux.intel.com
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Make sure the default return thunk is not used after all return
instructions have been patched by the alternatives because the default
return thunk is insufficient when it comes to mitigating Retbleed or
SRSO.
Fix based on an earlier version by David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>.
[ bp: Fix the compilation error of warn_thunk_thunk being an invisible
symbol, hoist thunk macro into calling.h ]
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Co-developed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231010171020.462211-4-david.kaplan@amd.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240104132446.GEZZaxnrIgIyat0pqf@fat_crate.local
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The following commit:
ddb5cdbafaaa ("kbuild: generate KSYMTAB entries by modpost")
deprecated <asm/export.h>, which is now a wrapper of <linux/export.h>.
Use <linux/export.h> in *.S as well as in *.c files.
After all the <asm/export.h> lines are replaced, <asm/export.h> and
<asm-generic/export.h> will be removed.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230806145958.380314-2-masahiroy@kernel.org
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jmp2ret mitigates the easy-to-attack case at relatively low overhead.
It mitigates the long speculation windows after a mispredicted RET, but
it does not mitigate the short speculation window from arbitrary
instruction boundaries.
On Zen2, there is a chicken bit which needs setting, which mitigates
"arbitrary instruction boundaries" down to just "basic block boundaries".
But there is no fix for the short speculation window on basic block
boundaries, other than to flush the entire BTB to evict all attacker
predictions.
On the spectrum of "fast & blurry" -> "safe", there is (on top of STIBP
or no-SMT):
1) Nothing System wide open
2) jmp2ret May stop a script kiddy
3) jmp2ret+chickenbit Raises the bar rather further
4) IBPB Only thing which can count as "safe".
Tentative numbers put IBPB-on-entry at a 2.5x hit on Zen2, and a 10x hit
on Zen1 according to lmbench.
[ bp: Fixup feature bit comments, document option, 32-bit build fix. ]
Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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