diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/landlock/audit.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/landlock/domain.h | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/landlock/errata/abi-6.h | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/landlock/fs.c | 14 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/landlock/net.c | 118 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/landlock/ruleset.c | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/landlock/task.c | 12 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/lsm.h | 9 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/lsm_init.c | 7 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/min_addr.c | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/security.c | 2 |
13 files changed, 94 insertions, 88 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c index 7362f68f2d8b..5beb69edd12f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c @@ -250,9 +250,7 @@ void ima_kexec_post_load(struct kimage *image) if (!image->ima_buffer_addr) return; - ima_kexec_buffer = kimage_map_segment(image, - image->ima_buffer_addr, - image->ima_buffer_size); + ima_kexec_buffer = kimage_map_segment(image, image->ima_segment_index); if (!ima_kexec_buffer) { pr_err("Could not map measurements buffer.\n"); return; diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index a7ea4a1c3bed..6340823f8b53 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -465,7 +465,7 @@ out: } /** - * tpm2_unseal_cmd() - execute a TPM2_Unload command + * tpm2_unseal_cmd() - execute a TPM2_Unseal command * * @chip: TPM chip to use * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form @@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, return rc; } - rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, blob_handle, NULL); if (rc) goto out; diff --git a/security/landlock/audit.c b/security/landlock/audit.c index c52d079cdb77..e899995f1fd5 100644 --- a/security/landlock/audit.c +++ b/security/landlock/audit.c @@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ static size_t get_denied_layer(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain, long youngest_layer = -1; for_each_set_bit(access_bit, &access_req, layer_masks_size) { - const access_mask_t mask = (*layer_masks)[access_bit]; + const layer_mask_t mask = (*layer_masks)[access_bit]; long layer; if (!mask) diff --git a/security/landlock/domain.h b/security/landlock/domain.h index 7fb70b25f85a..621f054c9a2b 100644 --- a/security/landlock/domain.h +++ b/security/landlock/domain.h @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ struct landlock_hierarchy { */ atomic64_t num_denials; /** - * @id: Landlock domain ID, sets once at domain creation time. + * @id: Landlock domain ID, set once at domain creation time. */ u64 id; /** diff --git a/security/landlock/errata/abi-6.h b/security/landlock/errata/abi-6.h index df7bc0e1fdf4..5113a829f87e 100644 --- a/security/landlock/errata/abi-6.h +++ b/security/landlock/errata/abi-6.h @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ * This fix addresses an issue where signal scoping was overly restrictive, * preventing sandboxed threads from signaling other threads within the same * process if they belonged to different domains. Because threads are not - * security boundaries, user space might assume that any thread within the same + * security boundaries, user space might assume that all threads within the same * process can send signals between themselves (see :manpage:`nptl(7)` and * :manpage:`libpsx(3)`). Consistent with :manpage:`ptrace(2)` behavior, direct * interaction between threads of the same process should always be allowed. diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c index fe794875ad46..8205673c8b1c 100644 --- a/security/landlock/fs.c +++ b/security/landlock/fs.c @@ -939,7 +939,12 @@ jump_up: } path_put(&walker_path); - if (!allowed_parent1) { + /* + * Check CONFIG_AUDIT to enable elision of log_request_parent* and + * associated caller's stack variables thanks to dead code elimination. + */ +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT + if (!allowed_parent1 && log_request_parent1) { log_request_parent1->type = LANDLOCK_REQUEST_FS_ACCESS; log_request_parent1->audit.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH; log_request_parent1->audit.u.path = *path; @@ -949,7 +954,7 @@ jump_up: ARRAY_SIZE(*layer_masks_parent1); } - if (!allowed_parent2) { + if (!allowed_parent2 && log_request_parent2) { log_request_parent2->type = LANDLOCK_REQUEST_FS_ACCESS; log_request_parent2->audit.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH; log_request_parent2->audit.u.path = *path; @@ -958,6 +963,8 @@ jump_up: log_request_parent2->layer_masks_size = ARRAY_SIZE(*layer_masks_parent2); } +#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ + return allowed_parent1 && allowed_parent2; } @@ -1314,7 +1321,8 @@ static void hook_sb_delete(struct super_block *const sb) * second call to iput() for the same Landlock object. Also * checks I_NEW because such inode cannot be tied to an object. */ - if (inode_state_read(inode) & (I_FREEING | I_WILL_FREE | I_NEW)) { + if (inode_state_read(inode) & + (I_FREEING | I_WILL_FREE | I_NEW)) { spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); continue; } diff --git a/security/landlock/net.c b/security/landlock/net.c index 1f3915a90a80..e6367e30e5b0 100644 --- a/security/landlock/net.c +++ b/security/landlock/net.c @@ -71,6 +71,61 @@ static int current_check_access_socket(struct socket *const sock, switch (address->sa_family) { case AF_UNSPEC: + if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP) { + /* + * Connecting to an address with AF_UNSPEC dissolves + * the TCP association, which have the same effect as + * closing the connection while retaining the socket + * object (i.e., the file descriptor). As for dropping + * privileges, closing connections is always allowed. + * + * For a TCP access control system, this request is + * legitimate. Let the network stack handle potential + * inconsistencies and return -EINVAL if needed. + */ + return 0; + } else if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP) { + /* + * Binding to an AF_UNSPEC address is treated + * differently by IPv4 and IPv6 sockets. The socket's + * family may change under our feet due to + * setsockopt(IPV6_ADDRFORM), but that's ok: we either + * reject entirely or require + * %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP for the given port, so + * it cannot be used to bypass the policy. + * + * IPv4 sockets map AF_UNSPEC to AF_INET for + * retrocompatibility for bind accesses, only if the + * address is INADDR_ANY (cf. __inet_bind). IPv6 + * sockets always reject it. + * + * Checking the address is required to not wrongfully + * return -EACCES instead of -EAFNOSUPPORT or -EINVAL. + * We could return 0 and let the network stack handle + * these checks, but it is safer to return a proper + * error and test consistency thanks to kselftest. + */ + if (sock->sk->__sk_common.skc_family == AF_INET) { + const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr = + (struct sockaddr_in *)address; + + if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (sockaddr->sin_addr.s_addr != + htonl(INADDR_ANY)) + return -EAFNOSUPPORT; + } else { + if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133) + return -EINVAL; + else + return -EAFNOSUPPORT; + } + } else { + WARN_ON_ONCE(1); + } + /* Only for bind(AF_UNSPEC+INADDR_ANY) on IPv4 socket. */ + fallthrough; case AF_INET: { const struct sockaddr_in *addr4; @@ -119,57 +174,18 @@ static int current_check_access_socket(struct socket *const sock, return 0; } - /* Specific AF_UNSPEC handling. */ - if (address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC) { - /* - * Connecting to an address with AF_UNSPEC dissolves the TCP - * association, which have the same effect as closing the - * connection while retaining the socket object (i.e., the file - * descriptor). As for dropping privileges, closing - * connections is always allowed. - * - * For a TCP access control system, this request is legitimate. - * Let the network stack handle potential inconsistencies and - * return -EINVAL if needed. - */ - if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP) - return 0; - - /* - * For compatibility reason, accept AF_UNSPEC for bind - * accesses (mapped to AF_INET) only if the address is - * INADDR_ANY (cf. __inet_bind). Checking the address is - * required to not wrongfully return -EACCES instead of - * -EAFNOSUPPORT. - * - * We could return 0 and let the network stack handle these - * checks, but it is safer to return a proper error and test - * consistency thanks to kselftest. - */ - if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP) { - /* addrlen has already been checked for AF_UNSPEC. */ - const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr = - (struct sockaddr_in *)address; - - if (sock->sk->__sk_common.skc_family != AF_INET) - return -EINVAL; - - if (sockaddr->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY)) - return -EAFNOSUPPORT; - } - } else { - /* - * Checks sa_family consistency to not wrongfully return - * -EACCES instead of -EINVAL. Valid sa_family changes are - * only (from AF_INET or AF_INET6) to AF_UNSPEC. - * - * We could return 0 and let the network stack handle this - * check, but it is safer to return a proper error and test - * consistency thanks to kselftest. - */ - if (address->sa_family != sock->sk->__sk_common.skc_family) - return -EINVAL; - } + /* + * Checks sa_family consistency to not wrongfully return + * -EACCES instead of -EINVAL. Valid sa_family changes are + * only (from AF_INET or AF_INET6) to AF_UNSPEC. + * + * We could return 0 and let the network stack handle this + * check, but it is safer to return a proper error and test + * consistency thanks to kselftest. + */ + if (address->sa_family != sock->sk->__sk_common.skc_family && + address->sa_family != AF_UNSPEC) + return -EINVAL; id.key.data = (__force uintptr_t)port; BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(port) > sizeof(id.key.data)); diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.c b/security/landlock/ruleset.c index dfcdc19ea268..0a5b0c76b3f7 100644 --- a/security/landlock/ruleset.c +++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.c @@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ #include <linux/workqueue.h> #include "access.h" -#include "audit.h" #include "domain.h" #include "limits.h" #include "object.h" diff --git a/security/landlock/task.c b/security/landlock/task.c index 2385017418ca..833bc0cfe5c9 100644 --- a/security/landlock/task.c +++ b/security/landlock/task.c @@ -86,7 +86,6 @@ static int hook_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *const child, const unsigned int mode) { const struct landlock_cred_security *parent_subject; - const struct landlock_ruleset *child_dom; int err; /* Quick return for non-landlocked tasks. */ @@ -96,7 +95,8 @@ static int hook_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *const child, scoped_guard(rcu) { - child_dom = landlock_get_task_domain(child); + const struct landlock_ruleset *const child_dom = + landlock_get_task_domain(child); err = domain_ptrace(parent_subject->domain, child_dom); } @@ -166,15 +166,15 @@ static int hook_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *const parent) } /** - * domain_is_scoped - Checks if the client domain is scoped in the same - * domain as the server. + * domain_is_scoped - Check if an interaction from a client/sender to a + * server/receiver should be restricted based on scope controls. * * @client: IPC sender domain. * @server: IPC receiver domain. * @scope: The scope restriction criteria. * - * Returns: True if the @client domain is scoped to access the @server, - * unless the @server is also scoped in the same domain as @client. + * Returns: True if @server is in a different domain from @client, and @client + * is scoped to access @server (i.e. access should be denied). */ static bool domain_is_scoped(const struct landlock_ruleset *const client, const struct landlock_ruleset *const server, diff --git a/security/lsm.h b/security/lsm.h index 81aadbc61685..db77cc83e158 100644 --- a/security/lsm.h +++ b/security/lsm.h @@ -37,15 +37,6 @@ int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task); /* LSM framework initializers */ -#ifdef CONFIG_MMU -int min_addr_init(void); -#else -static inline int min_addr_init(void) -{ - return 0; -} -#endif /* CONFIG_MMU */ - #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITYFS int securityfs_init(void); #else diff --git a/security/lsm_init.c b/security/lsm_init.c index 05bd52e6b1f2..573e2a7250c4 100644 --- a/security/lsm_init.c +++ b/security/lsm_init.c @@ -489,12 +489,7 @@ int __init security_init(void) */ static int __init security_initcall_pure(void) { - int rc_adr, rc_lsm; - - rc_adr = min_addr_init(); - rc_lsm = lsm_initcall(pure); - - return (rc_adr ? rc_adr : rc_lsm); + return lsm_initcall(pure); } pure_initcall(security_initcall_pure); diff --git a/security/min_addr.c b/security/min_addr.c index 0fde5ec9abc8..56e4f9d25929 100644 --- a/security/min_addr.c +++ b/security/min_addr.c @@ -5,8 +5,6 @@ #include <linux/sysctl.h> #include <linux/minmax.h> -#include "lsm.h" - /* amount of vm to protect from userspace access by both DAC and the LSM*/ unsigned long mmap_min_addr; /* amount of vm to protect from userspace using CAP_SYS_RAWIO (DAC) */ @@ -54,10 +52,11 @@ static const struct ctl_table min_addr_sysctl_table[] = { }, }; -int __init min_addr_init(void) +static int __init mmap_min_addr_init(void) { register_sysctl_init("vm", min_addr_sysctl_table); update_mmap_min_addr(); return 0; } +pure_initcall(mmap_min_addr_init); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 31a688650601..67af9228c4e9 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ do { \ #define DEFINE_LSM_STATIC_CALL(NUM, NAME, RET, ...) \ DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(LSM_STATIC_CALL(NAME, NUM), \ *((RET(*)(__VA_ARGS__))NULL)); \ - DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(SECURITY_HOOK_ACTIVE_KEY(NAME, NUM)); + static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(SECURITY_HOOK_ACTIVE_KEY(NAME, NUM)); #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \ LSM_DEFINE_UNROLL(DEFINE_LSM_STATIC_CALL, NAME, RET, __VA_ARGS__) |